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ABSTRACT
This empirical study has two objectives both of which are directly related to nonlinear
effects of debt on growth: The main objective is to assess the levels of public debt-toGDP and total external debt-to-GDP ratios above which economic growth is impaired. The
second objective is to examine the debt overhang effects on the sources of growth. A
large panel data set of developed and developing countries over the period of 1970-2009 is
employed to estimate the threshold levels for public and total external debt. The dynamic
panel threshold method developed by Kremer et. al (2010) is applied to debt-growth nexus
for the first time to estimate the debt thresholds. The method estimates threshold values
from the data rather than imposing arbitrary values to study the debt threshold effects as had
been done in the literature until now. The level of public debt above which the growth starts
being a burden is 69% for high income OECD countries, 47% for middle income countries
and 30% for low income. The model is modified to distinguish between the marginal and
average debt overhang effects on growth. For high income OECD countries, once public
debt-to-GDP exceeds the threshold, each additional unit of public debt lowers growth rate
significanlty by about 0.1 percentage point. In middle income countries, however, the
public debt overhang effect is observed through a significant slow down in average growth
rate rather than a marginal impact on growth. For external debt, the threshold is around
80% for high income OECD countries, 50% for middle income countries, and 70% for low
income group. Once these thresholds are exceeded, all countries face with a considerable
decrease in their growth rates but the impact of each additional unit of external debt above
the threshold is not significant. Therefore, countries’ trend-growth is not effected as they
accumulate more external debt beyond the threshold. For both public and external debt,
the negative realtionship between debt and growth is mostly due to the decrease in capital
stock accumulation for high debt levels rather than TFP growth.
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INTRODUCTION
Increased access to financial markets give countries the ability to finance their growth

through domestic and foreign loans as investments are not constrained by domestic savings
anymore. However, the conventional wisdom is that high levels of debt can limit growth
as it would crowd out investment and scare away capital and the credit suppliers. This perception is reflected in policy makers’ views as well. The Director of the IMF Fiscal Affairs
Department, Carlo Cottarelli, stated at a seminar held at the Sapienza University in Rome
on January 25, 2011 that: “in addition to problems for growth arising from a debt crisis,
one should also be worried about problems for growth arising from high, even if stable
debt” [15]. Therefore, on one hand international borrowing is expected to enhance growth
by adding to a country’s existing productive capacity while on the other hand, excess levels
of debt might become a burden on growth.
The current high debt and slow growth era increased the concerns of policymakers,
economists and individuals about the fiscal sustainability of high debt and the contractionary effects of debt on growth. If opening an economy to capital flows and eliminating
financial autarky enhances growth by adding to the productive capacity of the countries,
then, when does borrowing start becoming a restriction on growth? In other words, is there
a level of debt-to-GDP ratio above which the growth is impaired? These are the questions
that concerns the debt overhang theory. However, despite these concerns and the renewed
attention of economists on the debt-growth nexus, there is not a well-developed systematic
evidence to identify the sustainable levels of debt.
The recent study of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) drew attention to this non-linear relationship between debt and growth. They introduced a new historical data set on central
government and external debt of 44 countries over a 200 years time span, and followed a
data-intensive approach to identify the link between debt, growth, and inflation. Their anal-
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ysis suggests that when government debt-to-GDP exceeds 90% threshold, average growth
falls by more than 1% in both advanced and emerging economies. They determined the
threshold for external debt (public and private) as 90% for advanced economies and 60%
for emerging markets. Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) study is an important contribution to
the literature, however, because the analysis are based on simple descriptive statistics, these
thresholds are need to be examined with a more advanced empirical method.
There are several empirical studies prior to Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) work aiming
to define these debt thresholds. The common feature of the estimation methods employed
in these studies is that they impose arbitrary threshold levels on estimation models and evaluate the non-linear effects of debt on growth based on these arbitrary thresholds. Moreover,
those studies lack evidence to identify the impact of debt on the sources of growth, such as
capital accumulation, productivity and human capital. Therefore, this study has two objectives both of which are directly related with the nonlinear effects of debt on growth. The
main research focus is on determining public and total external debt thresholds above which
economic growth is impaired. The second objective addresses the channels discussed in
debt overhang theory through which debt affects growth such as capital accumulation and
productivity growth.
This study introduces a new empirical method to the literature on the debt-growth
nexus. It is the first application of the dynamic panel threshold estimation method developed by Kremer S., Bick A. and Nautz D. (2011) [28] in debt-growth nexus. The threshold
estimation model is first developed by Hansen (1999) for static panel data estimations and
advanced by Caner and Hansen (2004) [7] for a dynamic cross-sectional threshold model.
Kremer et. al. (2011) combined these two estimation models and obtained a threshold
model for a dynamic panel data estimations.
In the empirical estimation, the paper considers the debt-to-GDP ratio as threshold variable. The main contribution of the estimation method employed is that it estimates the debt
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threshold levels from the data rather than imposing arbitrary threshold values on estimation. Once a significant debt threshold is obtained, the sample is splitted into “low debt”
and “high debt” regimes based on the estimated threshold level of debt and debtoverhang
effects are tested. The estimation model is also advantageous to distinguish between the
level and marginal effects of debt on growth when the economy moves from low to high
debt regime. Level effect of debt on growth is observed when growth rate jumps up or
down significantly as soon as the debt exceeds threshold level. Marginal impact of debt on
growth is the significant change in trend-growth with every additional increase in debt-toGDP ratio. Therefore, level effect is presented by a regime dependent intercept while the
marginal effect is presented by regime dependent slope coefficients. Two structural models
are estimated with this set up. The first specification measures both marginal debt overhang effect and the level effect of debt jointly. The second model is constructed to isolate
the level effect from the marginal effects of debt on growth by slightly modifiying the first
specification.
The dynamic panel threshold regression is estimated for an unbalanced panel data set of
128 countries over the period of 1970-2009 to analyze the long-run impact of both public
and external debt-to-GDP ratios on real GDP per capita growth. In an attempt to examine
the effect of debt on the two channels suggested by debt overhang theory through which
debt is expected to effect growth, the paper also estimates the threshold values for growth in
capital stock, and productivity. The study conducts an experiment on the sources of growth
as well by using the threshold values estimated from the real per capita GDP growth regression. The threshold values estimated from GDP growth regressions are imposed on
the regressions where capital stock, productivity and the human capital are the dependent
variables. The aim is to see the response of the determinants of growth to debt below and
above the threshold values estimated to be red lines for the GDP growth. The countries
in the sample are divided into “high income OECD”, “middle income” and “low income”
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countries in accordance with the World Bank’s classification of economies according to
their 2009 gross national income (GNI) per capita. The empirical results suggests different
thresholds for public debt and external debt for different groups of countries. The level of
public debt above which the growth starts being a burden is 69% of GDP for high income
OECD countries, 47% fors middle income countries and 30% for low income. The external
debt threshold is not as restrictive on growth as it is in the case of public debt as the countries gets poorer. The external debt thresholds is 80% for high income countries, 51% for
middle income countries and 74% for low income countries. The estimations for high income OECD and middle income countries produces the standard debt overhang results that
until the estimated thresholds are reached both public debt and external debt are growth enhancing. However, in low income countries, the debt is estimated to have a negative impact
on growth with different magnitutes in both regimes. This can be attributed to the immature
financial systems in low income countries that could result in financial repression.
External debt is observed to have an level effect but not a marginal one on growth. That
is, once the external debt exceeds the threshold, countries experience a fall in their average
growth rate, however, the additional increases in external debt would not have a significant
impact on growth. For public debt, the debt overhang effects vary across income groups.
In high income OECD countries, for instance, when public debt exceeds 69% threshold,
the growth rate falls by 0.1 percentage point with every additional dollar of public debt.
For external debt when the 80% debt threshold is reached, the average growth rate of High
Income OECD countries falls by 0.4 percentage point but beyond this threshold additional
increase in external debt does not have a significant effect on growth (ie. marginal effect
of external debt is insignificant for high income OECD countries). The threshold effects of
debt on total factor productivity and capital accumulation growth suggest that the inverse
relationship between debt-to-GDP ratio and per capita GDP growth is determined by capital
stock growth rather than TFP growth.

4

The rest of the paper is orginized as follows: The next section reviews the existing
literature on debt overhang theory and emprics. Section 3 presents some motivating figures,
and preliminary evidence on the relationship between debt and growth. Section 4 gives the
details of the estimation methodology and data. Section 5 presents the estimation results.
Section 6 focuses on the effect of debt on determinants of growth. Section 7 discusses the
robustness of the results and section 8 concludes.
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2

LITERATURE REVIEW
The discussion of high indebtedness and its adverse effects on growth is not new to

the economic literature. The debt crisis in 1980s drew attention to sovereign debt problems
in emerging markets and motivated some academic and policy debate on the impact of
external debt on growth. In 1990s, heavily indebted poor countries’ sovereign debt crisis
emerged. In line with these economic conditions, the focus of the past debt literature was
mainly on the impact of external debt on economic growth in developing economies.
The problem of 1980s, briefly, was that the countries with large stock of sovereign
debt were in need of new borrowing to service their existing debt while the creditors were
not willing to lend any further fearing from a default risk in the future. The situation in
1980s is explored through debt overhang theory models developed by Sachs (1984, 1988)
[44], Cohen and Sachs (1986)[14], and Krugman (1988) [30]. The main discussion of
all these models is that countries with large debt stocks are faced with reduced supply of
new loans due to the high possibility of default in the future. Increased sovereign risk,
high possibility of default together with the governments’ distortionary policies such as
imposing higher than optimal tax on investment to increase its ability to service debt would
discourage new investments, lower the capital accumulation and thus, lead to a slow down
in growth. Therefore, the debt overhang models claim that high indebtedness crowds out
investment and capital accumulation and in the end, countries are expected to suffer from
lower GDP growth rates once debt reaches to high levels. That is, these models do not
analyze the impact of debt on growth explicitly but instead point at investment and capital
accumulation as the two main channels through which debt effects growth. Determining
the levels of debt above which growth is impaired is the main focus of this study.
Sachs (1984) introduced three additonal assumptions to the basic model of international
loan markets: First, he imposed a limit on government’s taxation authority which in turn
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limited the government’s borrowing and ability to finance all the investments projects. Second, Sachs (1984) introduced debt repudiation to the model as an option for borrower countries. In the model, debt repudiation implies a positively sloped supply of funds, distorts the
incentives of borrowers and deviates countries from optimal borrowing behavior by leading
them to overinvest in risky projects and consume more than optimal levels. Lastly, Sachs
(1984) showed that individual and collective interest of creditors might conflict such that
even though lending is in the best interest of the credit market collectively, each individual
creditor refuses to give loans thinking that the others will do so as well. Therefore, he
suggests a cooperative act between creditors for a more efficient credit supply.
Krugman (1988) extended the debt overhang model by introducing a trade off between
new lending and debt forgiveness as two methods to deal with the debt overhang problem.
He stated that debt overhang effects arrise in countries with debt holdings exceeding the
feasible level as the future lendings will be discouraged due to the creditors’ expectation of
high possibility of default. His suggestion was that linking the debt forgiveness and new
financing to the measures of economic conditions would be mutually beneficial for debtors
and creditors.
Another contribution to the debt overhang models comes from Cohen and Sachs (1986).
They introduced an open economy model with an option for the borrowing country to repudiate its foreign debt. Their aim was to examine the lenders’ strategies and the evolution of
the rate of growth under the thread of debt repudiation. They set up a two stage borrowing
model. In the first stage the borrowing country goes through an unconstrained borrowing
and rising external debt period. The constraint on borrowing is binding in the second stage.
They showed that the equilibrium of rapid growth in the first stage is followed by a slow
down in growth in the second stage. Therefore, they concluded that limited government
commitment and risk of default leads maximum sustainable debt as a percent of GDP to
fall as the capital stock increases. More recently, Aguiar and Amador (2009) emphasized
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sovereign debt overhang by augmenting Cohen and Sachs’ (1986) work with political frictions and capital expropriation. Their study is particularly useful to unveil the diffrences
in open economies’ growth experience. They showed that countries accumulating foreign
assets more than foreign liabilities grow faster.
Debt overhang theory models justified the debt relief and forgiveness policies as new
approaches to overcome the high indebtedness problems of developing countries. The policy implications of debt overhang theories were reflected in Brady Plan (1989) which was
suggested as solution to 1980s crises and in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
program (1996) initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
(WB) as a result of 1990s debt crises. Brady Plan gave creditors a variety of options
to convince them reducing the existing liabilities of debtors who promised implementing
structural change programs. The program was also helpful for indebted countries as it provided them new money. The success of Brady Plan coupling the economic reform with debt
reduction influenced the international community to support a similar program following
the 1990s crises. The HIPC program aims reducing external debt burden of poor countries
to sustainable levels. Only the countries with unsustainable debt burden which cannot be
mannaged through traditional debt relief mechanisms are eligible for assistance as long as
they fulfill several conditions set by the program.

1

In line with the structure of the 1980s and 1990s debt crisis, the early empirical literature testing the debt overhang hypothesis focused on external debt problems of developing
world. However, the literature did not arrive to an academic consensus in support of debt
overhang hypothesis. Some studies found weak evidence in favor of debt overhang theory.
Claessens (1990) [12] , for instance, claimed that only the countries that are on the wrong
side of the debt laffer curve would benefit from unilateral debt reduction. Studying the
position of the highly indebted and sub-Saharan African countries on debt laffer curve, he
1 IMF

Factsheet, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm
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estimated that very few of those countries are on the wrong side of the laffer curve and
therefore, there would not be a gain from unilateral debt reduction. Cohen (1993) [13]
aimed defining the correlation between the least develop countries’ debt and investment.
He concluded that it is not the large debt that lowers investment but instead, actual service
of debt.
There is, however, other empirical studies that provide stronger evidence in favor of
a debt overhang effect. Elbadawi et al. (1997) [18] considered the nonlinear effects of
debt on growth by estimating growth regressions with fixed and random effects panel data.
They included both in linear and quadratic form of debt-to-GDP ratio in the regressions and
found the growth maximizing debt to GDP ratio of 97 percent. Patillo et al. (2002,2011)
[36] found evidence in favor of a nonlinear relationship between total external debt and
growth in developing countries. Patillo et al. (2004) [38] studied the channels through
which total external debt affects growth in developing countries with a nonlinear estimation
setting, and they concluded that one-third of the negative effect of debt on growth was coming through physical capital accumulation and two-thirds through total factor productivity
growth. Schclarek (2004) [46] tested whether there exist a nonlinear relationship between
external debt and growth for not only developing countries but also industrial counties by
using 15 different external debt indicators. He found that lower total external debt levels
are associated with higher growth rates for developing countries. However, above a certain
level of external debt, the observed negative relationship between external debt and growth
is due to the incidence of public external debt not the private external debt. The main characteristic of all these studies is that, they all focus on debt overhang effects of external debt
only. Moreover, the empirical work that estimates the non-linear effects of debt on growth
relies on the arbitrary threshold levels imposed on the data rather than estimating these
threshold values.
Debt overhang literature went silent until the recent global economic and financial cri-
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sis put the debt-growth nexus in the limelight again. However, different than the literature
following the 1980s and 1990s crisis, this time the research focus is on the public debt and
its nonliear effects on growth. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) introduced a new historical data
set on central government and external debt of 44 countries over a 200 years time span.
They split the observations into four arbitrary threshold brackets of 0-30%, 30-60%, 6090%, and above 90% and by using simple descriptive statistics they examined the growth
performance and inflation in those debt brackets. Their analysis suggests that when government debt-to-GDP exceeds 90% threshold, average growth of advanced and emerging
economies fall considerably. They determined the threshold for external debt (public and
private) as 90% for advanced economies and 60% for emerging markets. Reinhart et. al.
(2012) [40] defined the public debt overhang periods as the episodes in which the public
debt to GDP ratio is above 90% for 5 years or more. They get this definition from the
analysis of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). Again, by using simple descriptive statistics, they
found that through these episodes the growth rate is more than one percent lower than nonhazardous periods in advanced economies. Because Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) analysis
are based on simple descriptive statistics and data intensive approaches, these thresholds
are need to be examined with a more advanced empirical method.
Besides the empirical strategy employed, Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) work also received some commentary on the causal relationship they considered between debt and
growth. In order to clarify the questions raised regarding their study, Reinhart and Rogoff wrote up an article in Vox (2010) [39]. After highlighting the main findings of their
work, Reinhart and Rogoff discussed the three main points that their work received the
most commentary on: the threshold estimations and the methodology, non-linearities in
the data and the causality between debt and growth. They stated that the arbitrary threshold brackets of 0-30%, 30-60%, 60-90%, and above 90% were necessary start points to
evaluate the growth behaviours at various levels of debt. Referring to the methodology
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problems pointed in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) [26], they argued that a threshold definition was necessary to identify and examine the vulnerabilities in the economic structure
however, the 90% threshold should not be seen as a strict line where a few percentage point
above the 90% debt-to-GDP ratio, countries will experience completely different growth
performance. They emphisized that for high levels of debt there is evidence in favor of a
bi-directional causality. However, they discussed that the causation from growth to debt
does not follow with the real world evidence. Reinhart and Rogoff’s article in Vox drew
further attention from the economists. Krugman (2010) [29]questioned the direction of
causality between debt and growth in his article in New York Times and discussed that
inverse causality could well be the case. He argued that countries could be accumulating
debt due to their low growth performance rather than high indebtedness causes low growth.
Krugman’s main argument against Reinhart and Rogoff’s article was that if the post war
decades are considered then only Belgium, Ireland, and Italy would be the examples of
high debt-low growth causality. Therefore, he doubted that these three examples would be
sufficient enough to justify the 90% threshold level.
Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) work and the new data set pioneered new studies aiming
to estimate the debt thresholds and threshold effects of debt on growth. Kumar and Woo
(2010) [31] examined the effect of public debt on long run growth for a panel of advanced
and emerging economies. They studied both linear and non-linear effects of public debt on
growth by employing different econometric tecniques. Their linear estimations suggests an
inverse relationship between debt and initial growth. They also found evidence in favor of a
threshold effect such that the public debt have a significant negative impact on growth above
90% debt-to-GDP ratio. Checherita and Rother (2010) [11] studied the impact of public
debt on growth both in the long and the short run. However, they restrict their sample to
euro area countries. They employed a quadratic estimation to identify the possible U-shape
relationship between public debt and growth and found a turning point around 90-100% at
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which the positive impact of debt on growth turns to negative.
Few papers studied the non-linear relationship between debt and growth in more technical detail. Cechetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2011) [9] used Hansen’s (1999) [21] threshold
estimation model for non-dynamic panel data of 18 OECD member states over the 19802010 period. They estimated the threshold for government, non-financial corporate and
household debt above which debt has an adverse effect on growth. For government and
household debt, the threshold values are estimated to be around 85%, for the non-financial
corporate debt the threshold is around 90%. The main drawback of this study is that even
though initial income is among the regressors, they ignored the dynamic structure of their
estimation model and employed an estimation method developed for non-dynamic panel
data setting. Chang and Chiang (2012) [10] studied the non-linear relationship between
government debt and growth by employing panel smooth transition regression model for
a balanced panel of 19 OECD countries over the period 1990-2004. The panel smooth
transition regression model could be considered as a generalized form of Hansen’s (1999)
threshold estimation model. They used only two control variables; unemployment and
inflation. They estimated the government debt-to-GDP threshold value of 97.82% below
which the average GDP growth is approximately 1% higher than that of above the threshold. Their findings suggest a significant and positive marginal effect of government debt on
real GDP growth both below and above the threshold. Therefore, Chang and Chiang were
not able to find evidence in favor of the crowding out effect of debt on growth.
Growth empirics imply that initial income is an important and robust regressor for
growth regressions and thus, omitting it from the estimations is expected to lead problematic interpretations (see Durlauf et. al. (2005), Martin. S. (1997a,b)). However, the
initial income is not a strictly exogenous variable by construction and introduces a dynamic
structure to the growth regressions. Therefore,the estimation methods employed for growth
regressions must consider the substantial endogeneity bias that would be introduced when
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the dynamic structure of the estimation model is ignored. Looking at the recent empirical
literature on debt-growth nexus, it is observed that they either employed initial income as
a regressor but ignored the endogeneity bias and estimated non-dynamic panel threshold
models or did not include initial debt as a regressor at all to avoid the endogeneity problem. In either case, the estimation results would be misleading. Therefore, there is still not a
compherensive work on debt-growth nexus which considers the issue with a dynamic panel
threshold estimation. The only exception in the literature is Baum, Checherita-Westphal,
and Rother (2012)[5]. They combined Hansen’s (1999) non-dynamic panel threshold estimation model estimations with Caner and Hansen’s (2004) dynamic cross section threshold
estimation model to develop a dynamic panel threshold estimation model. For a sample of
12 Euro Zone countries, they found a multiple debt thresholds of 66% and 95% over the
period of 1990-2010. Their estimation set-up could be considered equivalent to the estimation methodology employed in this paper. However, there is a main distinction between
this paper and their study. The benchmark model of Baum et. al (2012) considers only
marginal debtoverhang effects on growth while in this study, both marginal and average
debt overhang effects are under investigation.
The causal relationship between public debt and econmic growth is investigated in a
recent study by Paniza et. al. (2012) [35]. Instead of using the lagged values of debt
ratio to account for the endogeneity, they introduced a new instrument variable to their
estimation by considering the valuation effect coming from the currency composition of
public debt and its interaction with the bilateral exchange rate. They failed to reject the
hypothesis that high debt has no causal effect on growth for a sample of OECD countries.
However, they stated that failing to find evidence in favor of a negative impact of debt on
growth does not rule out the possibilty that there may be channels through which debt could
impact growth negatively.
The empirical studies on debt thresholds, except that of Baum, Checherita-Westphal,
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Rother (2012), are either employing estimation methods that are based on arbitrary threshold values or non-dynamic panel models. Another important feauture of the recent emprical literature on debt-growth nexus is that the focus is mostly on the public debt and
its consequences in developed economies. That is, the relationship between external debt
and growth is ignored by the recent literature and there is even less evidence for developing world. And finally, the possible nonlinear relationship between debt and growth rate
of capital stock and productivity - the two channels suggested by debt overhang theory
through which the debt crowd outs growth - still needs to be investigated with an advanced
econometric method. Therefore, this paper differs from the existing debt-growth literature
in several respects. First, as breifly discussed previously, the emprical model employes a
threshold estimation model that takes the dynamic structure of the growth models. Second,
the empirical model employed in this study distinguishes the marginal and average debt
overhang effects. Third, the paper considers not only the debt overhang effects on growth
but also the impact of excess debt on capital stock and productivity growth to shed some
light on threshold effects on sources of growth. And lastly, the study is more compherensive in terms of the sample size as it is conducted not only for a specific group of countries
but instead considers different income groups to examine and study the differences and
similarities of these country groups.
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3

DEBT and GROWTH: PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
This section presents some simple statistics and estimations that provides preliminary

evidence regarding the non-monotonic relationship between debt and growth. The sample
is composed of an unbalanced panel data set of 128 countries over the period 1970-2009.
These countries are grouped in accordance with the World Bank’s criterion for classifying
economies according to their gross national income (GNI) per capita. Low income group is
composed of countries with GNI per capita $1,025 or less; lower middle income countries
are the ones within GNI per capita bracket of $1,026 - $4,035; and the income range for
upper middle income countries is $4,036 - $12,475. Because of the data limitations, lower
and upper middle income country groups are merged together to construct a middle income
country group. Therefore, the middle income group in this study contains the countries
with GNI per capita of $1,026-$12,475. OECD member countries whose GNI per capita
is higher than $12,476 are considered in the high income group. There are some OECD
countries whose income falls into the middle income range. Therefore, not all OECD
countries belongs to the high income group. Bearing this in mind, these high income OECD
countries will be referred as “high income” countries or “OECD” countries interchangably
in the following sections. The countries in each income group is listed in Appendix B.
Figure 1 presents the average total gross external debt and gross central government
debt as a percent of GDP for high income OECD, middle income and low income country
groups from 1970 to 2009. High income countries are represented with two lines in the
external debt plot. The blue line represents the whole sample of high income countries.
The green line represents external debt of high income country group after Luxembourg
and Switzerland are removed from the sample. One of the main reasons of excluding
Luxembourg and Switzerland is their special condition in the high income country group.
These two countries are the the net international creditors. That is, their external debt is
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less than the total of the external debt of other countries held by them. Moreover, these two
countries have the highest total gross external debt-to-GDP ratio of their income group and
their population size is considerably small compared to the other members, and therefore,
could be considered as outliers of the group. China is another net creditor country in
the sample. However, it is not excluded from the middle income country group and the
analysis as it could not be considered as an outlier when the external debt-to-GDP ratio is
considered.
Figure 1: Gross Total (Public plus Private) External Debt and Gross Central Government
(Domestic+Private) Debt as a Percent of GDP: High Income OECD, Middle Income, Low
Income Countries, 1970-2009

The current Euro debt crisis drew attention especially to Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
and Spain. Figure 2 plots the external debt structure of these highly indebted European
countries. The surge in external debt of these countries started early 1990s and reached to
unprecedented levels since 1970s. Today, the rise in the total gross external debt (public
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+ private external debt) of high income OECD countries is mostly due to these highly
indebted Eurozone countries.
Figure 2: Gross Total (Public plus Private) External Debt of Selected High Income Countries: Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Ireland 1970-2009

Note: The first column of Figure 2 plots the gross total (Public plus Private) external debt-to-GDP ratio
of Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain over the period 1970-2009. The second column adds Ireland to the set
of selected countries. Because Ireland has the highest external debt-to-GDP ratio compared to the other
countries in the set, the grid line of the Y-axis is on a different scale in the second plot.

As presented in Figure 1, since the start of the recent global crises, public debt-to-GDP
ratio in high income OECD economies increased sharply. For the same group of countries,
the rise in accumulated external debt started in mid 1990s and accelarated with recent
crises. The surge in external and public debt in low income countries inverted in mid 1990s.
This can be attributed to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) program initiated by
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in order to provide systematic debt
relief for the poorest countries aiming for poverty reduction. The downturn of indebtness
in middle income countries started earlier. This is partially to the Brady Plan that proposed
substaintial debt reduction the in 1989 for developing countries.
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Figures and the table in Appendix F present a summary of GDP growth for different levels of public and external debt across high income OECD, middle income and low
income countries over the period of 1970-2009. Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)
[39], for each of these three country groups, the observations of debt and GDP growth
are combined into four debt to GDP regimes for each year over the period of 1970-2009.
“Low debt” regime includes years during which debt to GDP levels were below 30 percent,
“middle debt” regime combines the years when debt-to-GDP ratio was 30 to 60 percent,
and the years with debt-to-GDP ratio 60 to 90 percent are grouped as “high debt” regime.
The years that have debt-to-GDP ratio above 90 percent are considered in “very high debt”
regime. For each debt regimes, average GDP growth is presented with bar charts.
For high income countries, the main observation from Figure F.1 is that, the relationship
between external debt and growth is inverted after the country exceeds 60% threshold while
GDP per capita growth and public debt is observed to be negatively related at all levels of
debt. For middle income countries, it is evident that, when external debt-to-GDP ratio
exceeds 60% threshold, the relationship between external debt and growth is inverted and
the output in middle income economies starts shrinking once the external debt as a percent
of GDP reaches above 90% level. Similar to case of high income OECD countries, public
debt and growth observed to be inversely related at all levels of debt for middle income
countries. However, when middle income countries move from low debt to middle debt
and from high debt to very high debt, the impact of public debt on growth is more severe as
it leads to a fall in growth rates on average by more than 1%. In low income countries, once
the countries move into high debt regime, the positive relationship between external debt
and growth is inverted and low income countries start experiencing negative growth rates
for external debt above 60%. For the same group of countries, the relationship between
public debt and growth is negative for debt-to-GDP above 60% and for the observations
with public debt-to-GDP over 90%, the average growth rate falls by more than 1 percent
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reaching to negative values.
The figures indicate a non-monotonic relationship between debt and growth. The implication is that debt accumulation above some threshold levels comes at a cost of notably
lower growth and it might even contract output.
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4

DATA and METHODOLOGY

4.1

Emprical Methodology:
This paper applies the dynamic panel threshold estimation model developed by Kre-

mer S., Bick A. and Nautz D. (2011) [28]to analyze the effect of debt on economic growth
for different groups of countries. They advanced static panel threshold model of Hansen
(1999) by combining it with Caner and Hansen’s (2004) instrumental variable estimation
of cross-sectional threshold model.
Hansen (1999) introduced an econometric approach to estimate threshold regressions
for non-dynamic balanced panel data with individual specific fixed effects. The model estimates the threshold levels and regression slopes with least squares estimation after eliminating the fixed effects by removing the individual specific means. He developed a bootstrap
method to evaluate the statistical significance of the threshold effect and an asymptotic
distribution theory to construct the confidence intervals for parameters. In the case of multiple thresholds, the model is able to determine all of these different threshold values as
well. Because the empirical literature on threshold analysis prior to Hansen’s (1999) work
was imposing arbitrary threshold values on estimation rather than estimating the threshold
levels from the data, his work is an important contribution to the literature of non-linear
estimation models and threshold analysis.
Hansen’s (1999) model requires all the explanatory variables to be exogenous. It is not
clear, therefore, how to apply Hansen’s (1999) estimation method in the presence of endogenous regressors and the heteroskedastic errors. This could be an important restriction
for the dynamic panel models. For growth regressions, for instance, initial income is a robust regressor that is used to control for convergence in oder to explore the effect of initial
conditions on long-run growth. Because, initial income is not a strictly exogenous variable
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by construction, it introduces a dynamic structure to the growth regressions.2 Therefore,
if Hansen’s (1999) method is used for the dynamic models, the estimation results would
suffer from a substantial endogeneity bias.
More recently, Hansen and Caner (2004) took the threshold estimation models one step
further and constructed a method relaxing the condition that all right hand side variables
should be exogenous. The model is developed for cross section regressions with endogenous variables and an exogenous threshold variable. The threshold parameter is estimated
with two-stage least squares (2SLS) and the slope parameters are generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimators.
In an attempt to develop a dynamic panel threshold model, Kremer S. et. al. (2011)
combined Caner and Hansen’s (2004) dynamic threshold estimation for cross section data
with Hansen’s (1999) threshold estimation for non-dynamic panels. They build a model
with one potential threshold that employs Caner and Hansen’s (2004) GMM type estimators. Their aim was to eliminate the estimation issues that would occur if endogenous
regressors were used in Hansen’s (1999) static set up. The dynamic panel estimation model
they developed brings another flexibility along with as it allows us to use unbalanced panel
data in the estimation. Due to the nature of the dynamic panels, they used forward orthog2 Following

Manuel Arellano’s class notes on dynamic panel data:
A fixed effect model with strictly exogenous regressors and the lags of dependent variable is represented
as follows:
0
yit = αyi,(t−1) + xi,t
β + ηi + νi,t

for t = 1, ..., T , assuming that
E(νi,t |xi,t , ..., xi,T , ηi ) = 0
The assumption implies that x is a strictly exogenous variable since it is uncorrelated to past, present and
future values of ν. However, the correlation between x and the individual effect η is still possible.
Lagged y, however, will be correlated by construction with η and with lagged ν. If ν is serially correlated,
lagged y could well be correlated with current ν.
Therefore, lagged y violates the strict exogeneity condition and is effectively an endogenous explanatory
variable in the fixed effect equation with respect to both η and ν.
source: http://www.cemfi.es/~arellano/predetermined-variables-class-note.pdf
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onal deviations transformation method suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) [3]instead
of first-differencing in order to eliminate the country specific fixed effects. As a result, the
serial correlation of the transformed error term is avoided, and therefore, the distributional
assumptions underlying the models developed by Hansen(1999) and Hansen and Caner
(2004) is not violated.
This study, therefore, is an application of the dynamic panel threshold model developed
by Kremer S. et. al. (2011) to examine the threshold effects of debt on growth. One
important contribution of Kremer et. al. (2011) to the estimation is that they account for
not only the marginal threshold effect but also an average threshold effect by introducing a
regime dependent intercept to the model. The structural equation of interest, therefore, is
the following:

yi,t = µi + β1 Xi,t I(Xi,t ≤ γ) + δ I(Xi,t > γ) + β2 Xi,t I(Xi,t > γ) + φ zit + εit

(1)

Here, I(.) is the indicator function, Xi,t is both the threshold variable and the regime
dependent regressor in this regression. (Kremer et. al, 2004) The model allows us to
split the data into two regimes according to the threshold level γ; data below the threshold
representing the low regime, and above the threshold is the high regime. The difference in
the intercept for the two regimes is measured by the regime dependent intercept δ , which
is same across all individuals. The significance of the parameter δ allows us to investigate
whether moving from low regime to high regime causes a shift in the dependent variable.
The regime dependent slope coefficients β1 and β2 measure the marginal effect of intercept
variable on growth which may be different in the two regimes. The scale of the threshold
effect is determined by δ and the difference between β1 and β2 : if the slope coefficients of
debt on growth in two regimes are not significantly different from each other (β1 = β2 ) and
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the regime dependent intercept coefficient is not significantly different from zero (ie.δ = 0),
then the threshold effect would be insignificant. If β1 6= β2 and/or δ 6= 0, the threshold effect
is significant. Control variables that contains both exogenous and endogenous variables are
stacked in vector zit . Instrument variables are taken to be the further lags of the dependent
variable (yi,t−2 , ..., yi,t−p ). Optimum number of lags are determined according to the over
identification test.
The main focus of this paper is on estimating the threshold effects of debt on growth.
Debt overhang effects on the determinants of growth is another concern of this paper.
Therefore, there are four dependent variables to consider. In addition to the real GDP
growth, growth rates of capital stock, TFP and human capital stock are also taken as dependent variables in the following sections. The debt-to-GDP variable Di,t is the threshold
variable and the regime dependent regressor that replaces Xi,t in the structural equation (1).
In our estimation, the initial income, yi,t−1 is taken as the endogenous variable for the reasons explained before. As discussed in literature review section, the debt is also a candidate
for endogenous variable due to the bi-directoral causal effect between debt and growth. The
endogeneity imposed by the debt variable is addressed by using the lagged values of debt
variable. Therefore, the structural equation can be re-written as follows:

yi,t = 4gd pi,t = µi + β1 Di,t−1 I(Di,t−1 ≤ γ) + δ I(Di,t−1 > γ)

(2)

+β2 Di,t−1 I(Di,t−1 > γ) + φ zit + εit
An important strenght of this estimation model is that it allows us to measure a regime
dependent intercept denoted as δ . In his study, Bick (2010)[6] showed that because Hansen’s
(1999) standard panel threshold estimation does not consider a regime dependent intercept
(δ ) along with regime dependent slopes (β1 and β2 ), the estimations may suffer from omitted variable bias that could be both statistically and economically significant. Thus, by
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including this regime dependent intercept, we not only avoid a potential omitted variable
bias but also control for the differences in the regime intercepts even when there exists fixed
effects. The draw back of the model developed by Kremer et. al. (2011) is that the model is
built to specify only one threshold. Therefore, in the case of multiple thresholds, the model
is only able to detect the threshold level that has the strongest effect on estimation.

Figure 3: Debt Overhang Effects

In the first panel, both the marginal and average effect of debt on growth is significant. In the middle panel,
the growth rate falls significantly however, debt has no marginal impact on growth. In the last panel, only the
marginal effect of debt on growth is significant.

Because the regime dependent slope coefficients and the intercept are included in the
same regression, the equation (2) combines the marginal threshold effect on GDP per capita
growth and the average change in GDP per capita growth rate. Assuming standard debt
overhang effects, there are three cases where a significiant threshold effect can be detected.
These cases are illustrated in Figure 3. As represented in the first panel of Figure 3, both

24

marginal and average debt overhang effects could be significant. It is the case where the
slope coefficients of debt on growth in two regimes would be significantly different from
each other (β1 6= β2 ) and the regime dependent intercept coefficient would be significantly
different from zero (ie.δ 6= 0). It could also be the case that once a certain threshold level
is passed, the average growth rate shifts down significantly while impact of each additional
debt stays the same above and below the threshold as displayed in the middle panel. Lastly,
the positive marginal impact of debt on growth could be inverted above the threshold level
while there would be no significant cut off in average growth rate. This is the case displayed
by the last panel of Figure 3. The threshold is marked with a red dashed line in Figure 3.
Therefore, in addition to the equation (2), a second structural equation is also estimated
to seperate the threshold effect of debt on average growth rate from the marginal impact:

4gd pit = µi + δ I(Dit ≤ γ) + θ Di,t−1 + φ zit + εit .

(3)

In equation (3), debt-to-GDP variable is not a regime dependent variable any more as it
leaves regime dependent slopes out.

4.1.1

Threshold Estimation:

Following Caner and Hansen (2004); Kremer et. al. (2011) constructed 2SLS estimator for the threshold. A reduced form regression is constructed for endogenous variables
as a function of the instrument variables. The predicted values of the endogenous variable
ybi,t−1 are then used for the least squares estimation of the structural equation (2). For each
observed value of debt to GDP ratio, the structural equation is estimated and the sum of
squared residuals, denoted as S(γ), from each of these estimations are recorded. The debt to
GDP value that gives the smallest sum of squared residuals is determined to be the estimate
of threshold value, γ̂.
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γ̂ = argminS(γ)
γ

Regarding the equation (2), the threshold effect vanishes under the joint hypothesis:

H0 : β1 = β2
(4)

and
δ =0
against the alternative that at least one of the restrictions does not hold.

If we fail to reject the null hypotesis, the threshold γ would not be identified and the distribution of the statistical tests would not follow standard distributions. Caner and Hansen
(2004) recommended an extension of the Davies (1977) Sup test to the GMM framework.
Therefore, for each unique value of the threshold variable γ in the sample, equation (2) is
estimated. The Wald statistic for H0 is calculated by using regime dependent slope coefficient estimates and the covarience matrices as follows:


0 

−1 

 (β̂1 (γ) − β̂2 (γ))   (V̂1 (γ) − V̂2 (γ)) 
Wn = 


δ̂ (γ)
Vˆδ (γ)



 (β̂1 (γ) − β̂2 (γ)) 


δ̂ (γ)

The Davies Sup statistic for H0 is then the largest value of these statistics:

SupW = supγ∈ΓWn (γ)
Hansen (1999) suggested a bootstrap procedure to approximate the asymptotic null distribution of the test statistic and to construct asymptotically valid p-values. Once a significant threshold effect is obtained, the regime dependent slope and intercept coefficients are
estimated by GMM. Further more, Hansen (1999) showed that when the null is rejected, γ̂
is a consistent estimator of the true threshold value, γ0 . Notice that the p-value estimated
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from bootstrap procedure is used to test the joint null hypothesis (4), and therefore indicates
whether the there is evidence in favor of a significant threshold or not. That is, the p-value
reported is used to test the significance of the estimated threshold value, γ̂ that minimizes
the sum of squared residuals.
Significant or not the estimated threshold, γ̂, is imposed to the regression and the standard errors obtained from the GMM estimation are used to test for the individual significance of coefficient estimates of the regression. Therefore, for some instances, it could
well be the case that the threshold estimate γ̂ could be significant but some or all of regime
dependent coefficients (β1 , β2 , δ ) are insignificant individually. That is, the joint hypothesis (4) could be rejected, however, at least one of the following hypothesis could not be
rejected:

H0 : β1 = 0
H0 : β2 = 0
H0 : δ = 0
The same steps are followed for the structral equation (3) in order to estimate the threshold value and test its significance. The null hypothesis of H0 : δ = 0 is tested for the significance of threshold.

4.1.2

Confidence Interval Construction:

In order to construct a confidence interval for γ, null of H0 : γ = γ0 is tested with
likelihood ratio statistic, LR(γ). The LR(γ) statistic displays the difference between the
sum of squared residuals of the model for a generic value of the threshold and sum of
squared residuals corresponding to the estimated threshold scaled with sample varience.

LR(γ) =

ˆ
S(γ) − S(γ)
σ̂ 2
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The LR statistic is identically zero when γ = γ̂. Therefore, a plot of a normalized
likelihood ratio as a function of the threshold variable, LR(γ), against γ can be used to
illustrate the value of γ at which the graph of LR(γ) is minimized. It is also useful for
illustrating the ’no-rejection region’ (Hansen, 1999) of confidence level (1 − α)% for γ by
drawing a flat line at critical value C(α).
Therefore, the ’no-rejection region’ is:


Γ = γ : LR(γ) ≤ C(α)η̂ 2

The critical value C(α) is the (1 − α) percentile of the asymptotic distribution of the
likelihood ratio LR(γ):
C(α) = −2log(1 −

p
(1 − α)

The estimate of the nuisance parmeter η is used to scale the confidence interval in
the case of heteroscedasticity. Details of the nuisance parameter estimation developed by
Hansen (2000)[22] is included in Appendix A. Confidence interval is free of nuisance parameter for homoskedastic errors (ie. η = 1).

4.2

Data Description:
The dynamic panel threshold regression is estimated for an unbalanced panel data set

of 128 countries over the period 1970-2009. As described in Section3, these countries are
grouped in accordance with the World Bank’s criterion for classifying economies according
to their gross national income (GNI) per capita.
In order to net out the short run cyclical effects, all the variables used in this study are
averaged over non-overlapping 5-year periods. Therefore, we have 8 time periods from
1970-75 to 2005-2009. Four different variables are considered as dependent variable. In
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order to test the non-linear relationship between debt and growth, five year average GDP
per capita growth is used as a dependent variable. The GDP per capita data for each country
is taken from World Development Indicators (WDI). The five year average growth rates of
physical capital, human capital and total factor productivity (TFP) are also used as dependent variables to proximate sources of growth.
Perpetual inventory method is used to construct the capital stock dependent variable.
We start with the following capital accumulation identity which requires data on real investment (It ), initial capital stock (K0 ) and depreciation (δ ).

Kt+1 = (1 − δ )Kt + It

(5)

The common practice is to calculate the initial capital stock from the steady state capital
stock of Solow Growth model. Therefore,

Ko =

Io
g+δ

(6)

where g is average geometric growth rate of investment series between the initial year available and the year 1970. Depreciation rate is set to 6%.3 Following Caselli (2005)Caselli
[8], investment is measured from Penn World Tables, version 7.0 [PWT 7.0 - Heston A,
Summers R. and Aten B (2011)] as real aggregate investment in PPP4 . The initial investment level, I0 , is the first year observation of investment series that is available. For nearly
half of the countries in the sample, the investment series goes back to the year 1950. For
the rest of the sample, 1960 is taken as the initial year for investment. The constructed
3 To

account for the effect of depreciation rate in the perpetual-inventory calculation, three alternative
rates of depreciation were considered: 3%, 5%, and 6%. The impact on the growth rates of the constructed
capital stock series were not significant. Therefore, in line with Caselli (2004) and most of the literature, δ is
set to to 6 %.
4 I= RGDPL*POP*KI, where RGDPL is real income per capita obtained with the Laspeyres method,
POP is the population, and KI is the investment share in total income.
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capital stock series is also used in TFP calculation.
TFP series is formed by following the growth accounting method developed by Caselli
(2004). A constant returns to scale production function is adopted for total factor productivity (TFP) calculation:
Y = AK α (Lh)(1−α)

(7)

where K is the aggregate capital stock, L is the number of workers, h is average human
capital per worker and A denotes the total factor productivity.5 The capital share of GDP,
α, is taken as 1/3.
Therefore, the production function in per capita terms is:

y = Akα h(1−α)

(8)

Here, y is output per worker, y = Y /L. k is capital labor ratio, K/L. Human capital per
worker, h, series is a function of years of schooling, s.

h = eφ (s)

(9)

The source of schooling data is Barro and Lee’s (2010) [? ]data on years of schooling
in the population over 25 years old. The following piecewise linear functional form is used
to relate human capital to average years of schooling:

φ (s) =










0.134 · s

if

s≤4

0.134 · 4 + 0.101 · (s − 4)
if 4 < s 5 8






 0.134 · 4 + 0.101 · 4 + 0.068 · (s − 8) i f
8<s

5 Number

of workers is computed as RGDPCH*POP/RGDPWOK, where RGDPCH is real GDP per
capita computed with the chain method.
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Two different debt indicators are used in the study: Public debt-to-GDP and total external debt-to-GDP ratio. Public Debt refers to gross central government debt and includes
both domestic and external public debt. It does not include debts carrying a government
guarantee. External Debt, on the other hand, refers to the gross external debts of all
branches of government plus private debt that is issued by domestic private entities under a foreign jurisdiction.

4.3

Variables:

For the debt variable, Di,t , Historical Public Debt Database of IMF is used as the source of
public debt-to-GDP variable. There are two main sources for the total external debt data.
One of them is Global Development Finance Database (GDF) of World Bank and the other
is the External Wealth of Nations Database (EWNII) of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
Even though GDF databese covers more recent period, external debt data is only available
for developing countries in GDF database. Therefore, only for the developing countries
GDF is used as the source of external debt data. For high income OECD countries, external
debt data is gathered from EWNII database. The period of 2007 to 2010 that is not covered
in EWN dataset, external debt data is gathered from OECD statistics. In order to see the
marginal effect of public debt on growth independent of the average level of public debt,
debt variable is measured in levels at the beginning of the 5-year period.
Beside the debt variable, there are other variables that are used to control for factors
associated with growth. The initial income per capita, endogenous regressor of the estimation, is used to control for convergence. Average years of schooling is used as an indicator
of the human capital stock in the economy, the general government final consumption expenditure captures the size of government, degree of openness to trade is measured by the
openness variable and lastly, gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP is used to mea-
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sure the investment to GDP ratio of the economy. All these control variables are gathered
from WDI database.
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5

ESTIMATION RESULTS

For the rest of the paper, equation 2 which includes both regime dependent intercept and
slope coefficients in the same regression is referred as “model 1”, and equation 3 is noted
as “model 2” as it includes only the regime dependent intercept in the regression.

5.1

Estimation Results for Public Debt:
This section describes the estimation results to address the objectives of this paper

for public debt: the threshold level of public debt above which the economic growth is
impaired and threshold effects of public debt on the sources of growth.

5.1.1

Public Debt and Growth:

The threshold values for the public debt-to-GDP ratio and the threshold effects of
public debt on per capita GDP growth is displayed in Table1. For each income group model
1 and model 2 specifications gives the same threshold level. It is clear from the table that
the threshold gets more restrictive as countries gets poorer suggesting that poorer countries
start suffering from debt overhang at lower levels of public debt. That is, less sources of
finance available to the central governments of poorer countries before they face with debt
overhang. For high income OECD countries the level of public debt above which the debt
starts being a burden on growth is around 69% while the threshold level for middle income
and low income countries are 47% and 30%, respectively. The p-values suggest that, for
all the income groups, low debt regime slope coefficient (β1 ) is significantly different from
high debt regime slope coefficient (β2 ) and therefore the threshold estimates are significant.
The likelihood ratio plots for each income group is presented in Appendix G . For high
income OECD and low income countries, likelihood ratio plot is not well behaved, and
therefore indicates large confidence intervals and should be interpretted cautiously.
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Table 1: Public Debt and Growth
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Our public debt threshold estimate for high income OECD countries is smaller compared to results of the recent study by Cechetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2011) as their
threshold estimate for government debt is around 85% for 18 OECD member states. However, Cechetti, Mohanty and Zampolli’s (2011) results are not exactly comparable to those
presented here as they ignored the endogeneity bias and used Hansen’s (1999) threshold estimation model for non-dynamic panel data for their dynamic regression set-up. Moreover,
their sample is not comparable with this study as they consider 18 OECD countries in their
sample over 1980-2010 period while this study considers 31 OECD member states for the
period of 1970-2009. Baum, Checherita-Westphal, Rother (2012) [5], on the other hand,
applied a dynamic panel threshold estimation set up for a sample of 12 Euro Zone countries
and found a significant debt threshold around 66%. Though, their sample and time period
coverage is not an exact match with ours, the threshold estimate is very close to the findings
in this paper and therefore, suggests that, the dynamic nature of the regression model alters
the threshold estimate significantly.
The regime dependent intercept coefficient, δ , is estimated to be negative for all the
income groups in model 1, though none of them are significant. For high income OECD
members, the marginal effect of public debt on growth turns from positive to negative and
becomes significant once the threshold level of 69% is exceeded. The absulate value of
the regime dependent slope coefficients suggest that the correlation between public debt
and growth rate in high income OECD countries is stronger when public debt to GDP ratio
is high. Considering the 90% confidence interval, this conclusion is valid for public debt
to GDP levels between 69% and 81%. For low income countries the story is different.
Even before the public debt-to-GDP ratio reaches the 30% threshold, the marginal impact
of debt on growth is significantly negative. That is, public debt has a negative marginal
impact on growth for low income countries even for the low debt-to-GDP levels. This
negative marginal impact gets more severe once the threshold is reached, though the debt
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coefficient, β2 = −1.42, is far from being significant
In model 2, with which we drop the regime dependent slopes, the negative regime
dependent intercept coefficient, δ , becomes significant only for middle income countries at
1% significance level. In middle income countries, therefore, the growth rate of per capita
GDP is concluded to be on average half of a percent lower when public debt to GDP ratio
exceeds the 47% threshold.
The results of the two estimation models suggest that all country groups suffer from
high debt at various levels. High income OECD countries suffer from a marginal public
debt overhang: once the indebtedness level reaches above the 69%, the per capita GDP
growth rate falls by 0.1 percentage point with each additional unit of public debt-to-GDP
ratio. For middle income countries on the other hand, no evidence is found in favor of a
marginal impact of debt on GDP growth instead, it is the average growth rate that falls as
the public debt amount exceeds 47% of GDP. Even though the growth rate of low income
countries suffer from public debt at all levels of debt, it’s the high income OECD countries and middle income countries that suffer the most from debt overhang effect when the
countries move from low debt regime to high debt regime.
Coefficient estimates of control variables for public debt growth regressions are presented in Appendix D, table D.1. The coefficient of initial income is negative and significant across all income groups. The convergence rate of high income OECD countries is
slightly lower than that of middle and low income countries. Investment has statistically
significant positive impact on growth for middle and low income groups: A 10 percentage
points increase in investment to GDP ratio enhances per capita GDP growth by approximately one third of a percentage point middle income countries and two thirds of a percentage point in low income countries. Openness have a positive impact on high income
OECD and middle income countries, while its impact on growth of low income countries
is negative and insignificant. The sign of the coefficient on government expenditure is the
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opposite of the openness. The small and negative impact of government expenditure on
growth is significant only for middle income countries in full model specification. Years of
schooling is significant only for middle income countries. As years of schooling increases
by 10 percent, growth rate of middle income countries increases by about one third of a
percentage point. The coefficient estimates are similar in both models.

5.1.2

Public Debt, TFP and Capital Stock Growth:

This section examines the nonlinear relationship between public debt and the growth
rate of TFP and capital stock. As discussed before, in debt overhang literature TFP and
capital stock growth are addressed as the two main channels through which debt effects
growth. Therefore, the aim is to determine the critical levels of debt for the productivity
and capital stock growth. The first vertical bloc of each country group in Table 2 displays
the threshold estimation results when using the TFP growth as dependent variable while the
second vertical bloc of each presents the results for capital stock growth as the dependent
variable.
In model 1, where we have both regime dependent slope and intercept coefficients together, all the debt thresholds for capital stock growth are significant. Considering the TFP
growth regressions, for high income OECD group, there is no significant debt threshold
effect on TFP growth indicating that the regime dependent slope coefficients are not significantly different from each other, and the estimation results support that β̂1 ∼
= β̂2 . For high
income OECD and low income countries, estimated debt threshold levels for TFP growth
are higher than that of capital stock growth while for the middle income countries it is
the opposite as the debt threshold for TFP growth, 22%, is lower than the threshold level
for capital stock growth, 47%. This indicates that in high income OECD and low income
countries, compared to the TFP growth, the capital stock growth responds to the increase in
public debt as a share of GDP at earlier levels than middle income countries do. The pub-
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lic debt threshold for capital stock growth is the lowest for high income OECD countries.
According to the capital stock estimates, the public debt levels above 20% may already be
seen high for high income OECD group while the threshold estimate level of public debt
for middle income and low income countries are 47% and 39%, repectively. Higher public debt thresholds for poorer countries indicate that capital stock of high income OECD
countries starts suffering from the public debt overhang effect at much lower levels of debt
compared to the poorer countries. For each country group, the regime dependent slope
coefficients above the threshold level are significant in all capital stock regressions. The
confidence intervals for the thresholds indicated by likelihood ratio statistics are generally
tight and using 1%, 5% or 10% confidence levels would not change the interval much for
any of the specifications. Likelihood ratio plots are presented in Appendix G.

Considering the TFP growth regressions in model 1, for all set of countries, all the
regime dependent slope coefficients at high and low debt regimes are negative, however,
they are not significant. The relationship between the public debt-to-GDP and the growth
rate of the capital stock, on the other hand, is more precise than the public debt and TFP
growth relationship. For each country group, for instance, the regime dependent slope
coefficients above the threshold level are significant and negative. In high income OECD
countries the regime dependent slope coefficients indicate that if debt is below the threshold
(β1 = 1.64) there is a positive and significant correlation between public debt and capital
stock growth and once the public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the threshold, the slope coefficient becomes negative and stays significant (β2 = −1.22). Therefore, at high levels of
debt, doubling debt from any initial level at or above the threshold will decrease capitaloutput ratio in high income OECD countries by slightly less than 1 percentage point.6 For
middle income countries, at all debt levels, there is a significant and negative correlation
6 derived

by multiplying the coefficient of about 1.22 and the natural log of 2
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between capital stock growth and public debt. The absulate size of the regime dependent
slope coefficients indicates that reducing public debt level by 1 percent point adds more to
the capital stock growth if the public debt-to-GDP ratio is below the threshold.
When the second model is estimated by dropping the regime dependent slopes of the
first model, almost the same threshold levels of debt are estimated for both capital stock
growth and TFP growth. It is only the middle income countries whose debt threshold level
is altered, though not significantly. The regime dependent intercept becomes significant
for the TFP regressions of high income OECD and low income countries. For the capital
stock regressions, if we only allow the intercept coefficient to depend on the regime, it is
observed that the δ coefficients bear the public debt overhang effect on growth as they are
all estimated to be negative and significant for all income groups. The magnitute of the
average debt overhang effect almost doubles - if not stays approximately at the same level
as - in all country groups.
Therefore, because the estimates for TFP growth lack statistical precision, we do not
have strong evidence to conclude that the inverse relationship between public debt and GDP
growth is determined by the effect of TFP growth on GDP growth.

5.2

Estimation Results for External Debt:
In this subsection, the regime dependent variable is changed to external debt. For the

same country groups, the equation (2) , and equation (3) are re-estimated with GDP per
capita growth, capital stock growth and TFP growth as dependent variables.

5.2.1

External Debt and Growth:

For each specification and country group, Table 3 reports the results for the coefficients
of regime dependent regressors at high and low external debt regimes. As is the case for
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the public debt threshold regressions, for each income group full model and intercept only
model specifications gives the same threshold levels.
The marginal effect of debt on growth is insiginificant for all income groups. As is
the case in public debt, for low income countries, even the low levels of the external debt
lowers growth and the negative marginal impact of debt on growth becomes more severe as
the country moves to the high external debt regime. For high income OECD countries and
middle income countries, however, we see that an increase in external debt as a percentage
of their GDP adds to their growth performance for low levels of external debt, though not
significantly. The positive marginal effect of external debt on growth turns to negative and
remains insignificant as the high income OECD and middle income countries’ external debt
levels exceeds the 80% and 51% threshold, respectively.
The non-linear effect of external debt on growth is reflected by the significant coefficient
estimates of regime dependent intercepts when equation (3) is estimated instead. Above the
80% of external debt to GDP level, for instance, high income OECD countries’ per capita
GDP growth rate is on average 0.42 percent lower than the growth rate in high debt regime.
Middle income countries face with an average debt overhang effect only after external debt
to GDP ratio exceeds the 51% level as their per capita GDP growth rate is lower by about
0.63 percent above this threshold level. Low income countries’ growth rate above the 74%
threshold is by approximately 1 percent lower compared to the low debt regime.

The regression results suggest that all the countries start facing with negative impact of
external debt on growth at significantly higher threshold levels than they do in the case of
public debt. In the case of external debt, all income groups suffer from the average debt
overhang effect, rather than a marginal one as all the regime dependent slope coefficients
(β1 and β2 ) are insignificant. Therefore, countries in high debt and low debt regimes would
face a flat debt-growth relationship because marginal increase in debt have insignificant
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and close to zero effect on growth. It is when the countries moves into high debt regime
from low debt regime that they face with a decrease in average growth rate.
Coefficient estimates of control variables for external debt growth regressions are presented in Appendix D, table D.2. The coefficient estimates and significance is very close to
the public debt regression estimation. Therefore, interpretations will not be repeated here.

5.2.2

External Debt, TFP and Capital Stock Growth:

In order to further examine the non-linear effect of external debt on growth, the threshold models are replicated by using the growth rates of TFP and capital stock as dependent
variables. The results are presented in Table 4.
Regardless of the specification, for all the income groups, the estimated external debt
threshold levels for capital stock growth are lower than that of TFP growth which implies
that capital stock growth rates responds to the increase in exteral debt at lower levels of debt.
The TFP regression estimates of high income OECD and low income countries lack the statistical precision since none of the regime dependent regressors in any of the specifications
are significant. That is, regarding the first model, regime dependent slope coefficients β1
and β2 are significantly different from each other as we observe significant thresholds in
these regressions (β1 6= β2 ) however, they are not significantly different from zero individually (could not reject β1 = 0 and β2 = 0). For middle income countries, model (1) estimates
a more precise relationship between the external debt-to-GDP ratio and the growth rate of
the TFP: there is a significant external debt threshold level of 63% for the TFP growth, and
the correlation between external debt and TFP growth is negative and significant beyond
the threshold at 1% level. Therefore, we may conlcude that the accumulation of external
debt is relatively neutral in middle income countries, but once the threshold is exceeded,
if the external debt as a percentage of GDP doubles, TFP growth rate of middle income
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countries goes down by approximately two thirds of a percentage point.7
Cosidering the capital stock regressions, the estimations suggest that the external debt
threshold for capital stock growth is the lowest for high income OECD countries while
the threshold levels for middle and low income groups are close to each other: the threshold estimate level of extenal debt for high income OECD group is 19%, while it is 32%
and 30% for middle income and low income countries, repectively. The threshold levels
for middle and low income countries are altered in the second specification. Low income
countries’ capital stock growth regressions present an interesting result. The regime dependent coefficients (β1 , β2 and δ ) and the slope coefficient of debt (θ ) are approximately
equal to eachother. Therefore, the estimations are not able to reject the joint null hypothesis
of (H0 : β1 = β2 and δ = 0 )indicating an insignificant threshold for model I. Therefore,
one may conclude that in low income countries there is no specific external debt cut off
level for capital stock growth above which the capital stock growth falls marginally. The
only conclusion that can be made for low income countries is that the growth level of capital stock goes down on average by approximately 1 percentage point as the external debt
doubles regardless of the regime the country belongs to.

7 computed
8 computed

as -0.98*ln(2) = -0.68
as -1.6*ln(2) = -1.1

44

8

Table 4: External Debt and Sources of Growth

*/**/*** indicates coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 10/5/1% level
In model (1), high income OECD and middle income groups face a significant and
negative correlation between external debt and capital stock growth at high levels of debt.
When the absulate value of regime dependent regressors (β1 and β2 ) of the capital stock
estimation are considered, it’s observed that the magnitude of the marginal effect of debt
on capital stock growth is smaller for low debt regime compared to the high debt regime
(β2  β1 ) for both income groups . This suggests that regardless of the income group
that a country belongs to, the correlation between external debt and capital stock growth
is stronger when debt level is high. Therefore, in middle income countries for instance, if
external debt is above the threshold, a decrease in external debt to GDP ratio adds more to
the capital stock growth rate than it would in low debt regime. For all the income groups,
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model (3) estimates suggest that regime dependent intercept coefficient becomes smaller
once we drop the regime dependent slope coefficients (β1 and β2 ) from the estimation.
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6

DEBT OVERHANG EFFECTS on DETERMINANTS
of GROWTH
In the previous section, public and external debt thresholds and debt overhang effects

are estimated for growth rates of GDP and the two main channels discussed in debt overhang theory through which debt effects growth (TFP and capital stock). The estimation
results suggest that for each country group, the public and external debt thresholds for
growth rates of GDP, TFP and capital stock are different from eachother.

9

In this section, the focus is on the effects of debt on the determinants of growth. Therefore, recalling the production function given by equation (8), the growth rate of human
capital is also added to the regression analysis as a dependent variable in addition to the
capital stock growth and TFP growth. The main difference of this section from the previous
section is that here, we are not estimating the threshold for each of these regressions. Instead, the threshold values estimated from GDP growth regressions of each country group
are imposed on TFP growth, capital stock growth and human capital growth regressions of
corresponding countries. That is, for each country group, this section fixes the threshold
value at the level estimated from GDP growth regresssion and estimates the threshold effect on the determinants of growth by imposing these threshold values. The aim is to assess
the effect of debt on the determinants of growth for the debt level at which debt overhang
effects on GDP growth is observed.
This application has another implication. First, the production function given by equation (8) can be rewritten in terms of growth rates as follows:

∆y = ∆A + α∆k + (1 − α)∆h
9 The

(10)

only exception is the middle income countries. For middle income countries, both GDP growth
regression and capital stock regression suggests a 47% public debt threshold.
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Therefore TFP, capital stock, and human capital regressions are,

4A = µi + βA,1 Di,t−1 I(Di,t−1 ≤ γ) + δA I(Di,t−1 > γ)

(11)

+βA,2 Di,t−1 I(Di,t−1 > γ) + φ zit + εit

4k = µi + βk,1 Di,t−1 I(Di,t−1 ≤ γ) + δk I(Di,t−1 > γ)

(12)

+βk,2 Di,t−1 I(Di,t−1 > γ) + φ zit + εit

4h = µi + βh,1 Di,t−1 I(Di,t−1 ≤ γ) + δh I(Di,t−1 > γ)

(13)

+βh,2 Di,t−1 I(Di,t−1 > γ) + φ zit + εit
where γ is the threshold value at the level estimated from GDP growth regresssion in equation (2) and α = 1/3. Equaitons (11) through (13) imply that the regime dependent coefficients of GDP growth regresssion in equation (2) is a linear combination of the regime
dependent coefficients of the TFP, capital stock, and human capital regressions. More explicitly, for each of the regime dependent coefficient, the following linear relitionship is
expected to hold:

β1 = βA,1 + αβk,1 + (1 − α)βh,1

(14)

δ = δA + αδk + (1 − α)δh

(15)

β2 = βA,2 + αβk,2 + (1 − α)βh,2

(16)
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where β1 , β2 and δ are estimated from equation (2). Therefore, besides assessing the
effect of debt on the determinants of growth for the debt threshold level above which GDP
growth is lowered, this section also enables us to examine the size effect of indebtness on
determinants of growth.
The following two subsections presents the estimation results for public and external
debt.

6.1

Public Debt and Determinants of Growth:
For public debt, the threshold values estimated from GDP growth regression is 69%

for high income OECD countries, 47% for middle income countries, and 30% for low
income countries.
Recall that the dynamic panel threshold estimation method used in section 5 has two
major estimation steps. The first step estimates the threshold level by 2SLS, in the second
step the sample is splitted into “low debt” and “high debt” regimes based on the estimated
threshold level of debt and the slope parameters are then estimated by generalized method
of moments (GMM).
In this section, however, the threshold levels for capital stock, TFP and human capital
growth regressions are not estimated but rather, pre-estimated threshold values obtained
from GDP growth regressions are imposed. Hence, for the high income countries, for
instance, the threshold debt-to-GDP ratio that will be imposed on capital stock growth,
TFP growth and the human capital growth regressions is 69% and the estimation models
can be represented as follows:

4kH = µi + β1 DH,t−1 I(DH,t−1 ≤ 0.69) + δ I(DH,t−1 > 0.69)
+β2 DH,t−1 I(DH,t−1 > 0.69) + φ zH,t + εH,t
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(17)

4T FPH = µi + β1 DH,t−1 I(DH,t−1 ≤ 0.69) + δ I(DH,t−1 > 0.69)

(18)

+β2 DH,t−1 I(DH,t−1 > 0.69) + φ zH,t + εH,t

4hH = µi + β1 DH,t−1 I(DH,t−1 ≤ 0.69) + δ I(DH,t−1 > 0.69)

(19)

+β2 DH,t−1 I(DH,t−1 > 0.69) + φ zH,t + εH,t
For middle income countries 47% threshold is imposed on capital stock growth, TFP
growth and the human capital growth regressions. The threshold level imposed on determinants of growth is 30% for low income countries.
Because the threshold estimation is eliminated for capital stock, TFP and human capital
growth regressions, the 2SLS estimation is not used here. The regime dependent coefficients are estmated by dynamic GMM. Estimation results are presented in Table 4. The
first column of table 4 repeats the coefficient estimates from the GDP regression in Table
1. The second column lists the coefficient estimates of regime dependent variables for TFP
growth regression. The threshold effect estimations for capital stock growth and human
capital growth regressions are presented in column 3 and 4, respectively.
The estimation results for high income OECD countries indicates that when debt-toGDP level exceeds the 69% threshold level, it has a significant negative impact on productivity and capital stock growth. Considering the absulate values of the coefficients, it is
observed that once debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the threshold TFP growth slows down more
than twice as much as the capital stock growth. However, even though the effect of debt
on capital stock growth and TFP growth are significantly negative above the 69% threshold
level, this significance is not reflected in GPD growth.
For middle income countries, capital stock growth and human capital growth are ef-
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fected significantly from additional increases in indebtness while the effect of debt on TFP
growth is insignificant for both above and below the 47% threshold. Even though high
public debt have a significant impact on growth in capital stock and human capital, the β2
coefficient of GDP growth regression is not significant. For middle income countries with
high debt levels, each additional percentage point increase in debt-to-GDP ratio reduces per
capita physical capital trend-growth by about 2 percentage point while its effect on human
capital trend growth is only 0.2 percentage point. Note that, for middle income countries,
because the threshold estimate from GDP regression and the threshold estimate from capital stock regression are both 47% , the coefficients listed in the third column of middle
income countries are identical to the coefficients listed in Table 2, column 4.

Lastly, for low income countries, it is only the capital stock growth that is effected
from increase in debt-to-GDP ratio above the 30% threshold level. The effect of debt on
capital stock growth above the threshold is similar to that of the middle income countries.
Therefore, when public debt-to-GDP exceeds the 30% threshold, capital stock trend-growth
of low income countries fall by about 2 percentage point for each additional percentage
point increase in debt-to-GDP ratio. Again, this significant impact of excess public debt on
the capital stock component of growth is not reflected in GDP growth regression.
For each country group, it is observed that the linear combination of regime dependent
coefficients from TFP, capital stock and human capital stock regressions equal to those
estimated from GDP growth regressions, as indicated by equations (11) - (13) .

6.2

External Debt and Determinants of Growth:
In case of external debt, the threshold estimate from the GDP growth regression is

80% for high income OECD countries, 51% for middle income countries, and 74% for low
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income countries. This time, the same set of regressions are estimated for high, middle and
low income countries by imposing the respective external debt threshold values obtained
from GDP growth regressions. Regime dependent coefficient estimates of these regressions
are presented in table 5.
Regression results suggests that for high income OECD countries, the high level of
indebtness have a significant negative effect on the growth rates of capital stock and human
capital while its effect on TFP growth is insignificant. The positive marginal impact of
external debt on capital stock growth of high income countries turns to negative when the
external debt-to-GDP level exceeds 80% threshold. Above the 80% threshold, if external
debt-to-GDP doubles, the capital stock growth rate of high income countries goes down
by 3 percentage point on average10 and the capital stock trend-growth falls by about 1.5
percentage point with each additional unit increase in external debt-to-GDP ratio. The
impact of high external debt on human capital growth is also significant but much lower
compared to the capital stock growth for high income countries.
For middle income countries, it is only the capital stock growth that is effected significantly from the external debt. The positive and significant impact of external debt on
growth for low levels turns to negative once the 50% threshold is passed.
The estimation results suggest that at all levels of external debt, both the GDP growth
rate and the components of growth are effected negatively in low income countries.

10 computed

as -4.3*ln(2) = -3.39
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7

ROBUSTNESS
In order to check for consistency of the estimation results some additional tests are

conducted. First, the same regressions are estimated for the dynamic panel of 10-year average data incase 5-year averages would not be long enough to smooth out the business
cycle effects. Second, some additional control variables are included in the threshold estimation regressions. Lastly, the per capita income thresholds of World Bank’s analytical
income categories (low, middle, high income) are redefined by considering the changes in
the classifications of World Bank over time. The results are presented in Appendix H1.

7.1

Using 10- year Averages for Long Run Growth:
To account for the possibility that the use of 5-year averages would not be long enough

to capture long run effects, the same regressions are estimated for the dynamic panel of
10-year average data. The results presented in Appendix H suggests that the threshold
estimates are close to the case of 5-year average estimations. The confidence intervals are
narrower for 10 year average data for both public and external debt regressions.
Compared to the 5-year average public debt growth regressions, the threshold estimates
of all income groups are slightly lower. That’s over the 10-year period average , the public
debt thresholds for OECD countries falls from 69% to 60% while the public threshold
values for middle and low income countries are approximately 5 percentage point lower
than the 5-year average estimations with 41% and 25%, respectively. The marginal and
average impact of public debt on growth stays approximately the same for high income
OECD and middle income countries above the threshold. For low income countries, the
significance of the average fall in growth rate is improved for 10-year average data. That’s,
for 10-year average data, as the public debt to GDP ratio exceeds 25% threshold, the growth
rate of low income countries falls on average by about 1.4 percent.
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External debt threshold estimations are more robust in the long run compared to the
public debt thresholds. The threshold value for high income OECD countries stays around
80% while the threshold for Middle income countries fall from 51% to 47% and low income
countries’ from 74% to 70%. As in the case of 5-year averages, the marginal effect of
debt on growth is insignificant for all income groups and the impact of external debt on
the average growth rate stays approximately the same. Above the threshold, the effect of
external debt on 10-year average growth stays approximately the same as 5-year average
growth. Only for the middle income countries, the magnitute of the impact of external debt
on average growth rate is slightly higher: 10 year average per capita GDP growth rate is,
on average, 0.99 percent lower than the growth rate in the high debt regime whereas the
5-year average growth rate is on average, 0.63 percent lower above the threshold level .

7.2

Additional Control Variables:
To test for the robustness of the results, additional control variables are added to re-

gressions. These variables are the five year averages of population growth rate, political
stability index, and inflation rate. Population growth rates and the inflation are obtained
from World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank. The percentage change in CPI
index is used as an indicator of inflation. The Polity2 score in the Polity IV dataset Marshall and Jaggers [33] is used as a measure for political instability. The score ranges from
-10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).
It is observed that the threshold estimations of growth regressions did not change. For
both control variables and the regime dependent regressors, regardless of the control variable included, the change in the value of the coefficient estimates and their signicance is
very little.
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7.3

Income Groups:
The per capita income thresholds of World Bank’s analytical income categories (low,

middle, high income) are updated every year to keep income thresholds constant in real
terms over time. The earliest income category definition available at World Bank Database
is 1987. One may be concerned that the countries grouped according to 2009 criteria would
not be classified in the same income group in earlier periods. While most of the countries
observed to be stable in 1987-2009 period, there are some countries that moved from a
lower income category to a higher one during that period. For those countries that switched
to a higher income category, Table B.1 in Appendix B marks the years in which this move
is occured. Therefore, the income groups are redefined by considering the countries and
the dates listed in Table B.1. For instance, Greece is classified as middle income category
for 1970-1995 period and as high income OECD country for 1995-2009.
For public debt growth regressions, Table H.7. in Appendix H suggest tighter thresholds
and confidence intervals. The threshold estimate for high income countries falls from 69%
to 50%. For middle income and low income countries, the new thresholds are 25% and
15%, almost half of the previous estimates. However, the significance and direction of
the regime-independent variables stays the same with only one exception: The regime
dependent intercept of high income OECD countries when model 2 is estimated is now
signicantly negative. The significance level and the magnitute of all coefficients that were
significant before is improved with this new income classification.
The estimates of external debt growth regressions for the redefined income groups are
more robust. The results presented in Table H.8. suggests a lower threshold level for
high income OECD countries with 67% while the threshold estimates for middle and low
income countries did not change significantly. However, the narrower confidence intervals
suggest more precise estimates of thresholds. As in the case of public debt, the significance

57

and the direction of regime dependent coefficients are not altered.
This new definition of the income groups indicates more precise threshold estimates
due to narrower range of confidence intervals.
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8

CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyses the long-run impact of both public and external debt-to-GDP ra-

tios on GDP growth for an unbalanced panel data set of different income groups of countries
over the period of 1970-2009. It aims to find the levels of debt-to-GDP ratios above which
the economic growh is impaired. In an attempt to examine the debt overhang effects on the
channels suggested by debt overhang theory through which debt effects growth, the paper
also examines threshold effects on capital accumulation and productivity growth. Lastly,
the study examines the size effect of indebtness on determinants of growth by analysing the
effect of debt on the determinants of growth for the debt-to-GDP level above which GDP
growth is lowered.
The paper employs a new empirical method developed for dynamic panel data in order to obtain consistent threshold estimators and determine the threshold effects of debt
on growth. The main contribution of this estimation method to non-linear estimation literature is that it estimates the threshold levels from the data rather than imposing arbitrary
threshold values on estimation. Moreover, the estimation method accounts for not only
the marginal threshold effect but also an average threshold effect by introducing a regime
dependent intercept to the model. Debt-to-GDP ratio is taken as the threshold parameter
in the regressions and estimated with two-stage least squares (2SLS). Once a significant
debt threshold is obtained, the sample is splitted into “low debt” and “high debt” regimes
based on the estimated threshold level of debt and the slope parameters are then estimated
by generalized method of moments (GMM).
Two structural models are estimated with this method. Along with other controls, the
first specification includes slope coefficients and an intercept that differ depending on the
threshold value of debt-to-GDP ratio. The second speficiation is a special case of the fist
one as it drops the regime dependent slope coefficients from the regression and have only

59

the intercept that depends on the regime change. The aim is to seperate the threshold effect
of debt on average growth rate from the marginal impact of debt on growth. The same
models are reestimated to further examine the threshold effects of debt on total factor productivity and capital accumulation growth. The estimated threshold values are summarized
in Appendix E ,table E.1.
The empirical results suggest that public debt thresholds are lower than external debt
thresholods for all income groups. For public debt, there are important distinctions between the high income OECD, middle income and low income countries concerning the
estimated public debt-to-GDP thresholds. The public debt thresholds gets more restrictive
as countries gets poorer: For high income OECD countries the level of public debt above
which the debt starts being a burden on growth is around 69% while the threshold level for
middle income and low income countries are 47% and 30%, respectively. This suggests
that high income countries’ central governments could borrow more before facing debt
overhang effects than the central governments of poorer countries.
Considering the external debt, although high income countries still display the highest
threshold with 80%, the external debt threshold does not become too restrictive on growth
as much as it does in the case of public debt for poorer countries. External debt does not
have a marginal overhang effect on growth since we found no evidence in favor of a significant regime dependent slope coefficients in the first specification. That is, once the external
debt exceeds the threshold, countries experience a fall in their average growth rate however,
the additional increases in external debt would not have a significant impact on growth. In
high income countries, for instance, when public debt exceeds 69% threshold, the growth
rate falls by 0.1 percentage point with every additional unit of public debt but only after the
80% external debt threshold is reached average growth rate falls by 0.4 percentage point
and beyond this treshold additional external debt accumulation does not have a significant
effect on growth.
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The estimation results for high income OECD and middle income countries produces
the standard debt overhang results that until a certain threshold both public debt and external debt are growth enhancing. However, debt is estimated to have a negative impact
on growth at all levels in low income countries. This can be attributed to the immature
financial systems in low income countries that could result in financial repression.
The second set of regressions that examines the threshold effects of debt on total factor
productivity and capital accumulation growth suggest that the inverse relationship between
debt-to-GDP ratio and per capita GDP growth is determined by capital stock growth rather
than TFP growth. This is mostly true for both external debt and public debt which suggests
that excess debt may tend to crowd out economic activity by discouraging capital accumulation rather than lowering productivity. Another clear observation from the estimations is
that, for all the country groups external debt imposes a negative impact on capital stock and
productivity growth well before it does on output growth. However, for the public debt, we
cannot conclude the same for all income groups.
In terms of policy recommendations, the results suggest that for high income and middle income countries keeping external debt and public debt below a certain threshold would
have growth enhancing effects. Reducing external debt below a certain level would give a
one time rise to average growth rate of all country groups but it would not alter their growth
trend. In the case of public debt, however, lowering debt below the threshold in high income
OECD countries would give a positive boost to their growth trend. Therefore, especially
for high income OECD countries, lowering public debt could be a more beneficial policy
than reducing external debt. However, considering the tight public debt thresholds, implementation of this policy requires more tedious work. For low income countries, debt is
always negatively correlated with growth. This result might be due to vulnerabilities associated with weak financial markets in low income countries and merits further research.
Debt reduction would contribute to growth by boosting capital accumulation rather than
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productivity growth.
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APPENDICES
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Appendix A
Nuisance Parameter (η 2 )
If heteroskedasticity is suspected, η 2 as a ratio of two conditional expectations must
be estimated consistently:

η2 =

E(r1i |qi = γ0 )
E(r2i |qi = γ0 )
0

0

where for δn = (β1 − β2 ); r1i = (δn xi )2 (e2i /σ 2 ) and r2i = (δn xi )2 . Since r1i and r2i are not
observed, they are replaced by with their sample counterparts.
The simple estimator of η 2 could therefore, be a ratio of quadratic polynomial regression:

r̂ ji = µ̂ j0 + µ̂ j1 qi + µ̂ j2 q2i + ε̂ ji
Therefore,

η2 =

µ̂10 + µ̂11 γ̂ + µ̂12 γ̂ 2
µ̂10 + µ̂21 γ̂ + µ̂22 γ̂ 2

Hansen (2000) suggested Kernel regression as an alternative method to obtain the nuisance parameter, η. The Nadaraya - Watson Kernek Estimator for η is then,
n

∑ Kh(γ̂ − qi)τ̂1i

η2 =

i=1
n

∑ Kh(γ̂ − qi)τ̂2i

i=1

where Kh (u) = h−1 K(u/h) for some bandwidth h and kernel K(u), such as the Epanechnikov K(u) = 34 (1 − u2 ) {|u| ≤ 1}. The bandwidth h can be selected according to a minimum mean square error criterion.
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Appendix B
B.1. List of Countries according to 2009 GNI per capita values:
Countries are grouped according World Bank’s criterion for classifying economies
according to their 2009 GNI per capita values. The groups are: low income, $1,025 or less;
middle income, $1,026 - $12,475; and high income, $12,476 or more.
High Income OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia,Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Rep., Slovenia,
Spain, Sweeden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Middle Income: Algeria, Argentina, Albania, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Cameroon, Chilie, China, Colombia, Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivore, Dominican
Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvadore, Fiji, Gabon, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Jameica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, South
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Tonga, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
Low Income: Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Rep., Congo Dem.
Rep., Ghana, Gambia, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyz Rep., Laos, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leo, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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B.2 Change in the List of Countries: 1987 GNI per capita vs. 2009 GNI
per capita values:
The per capita income thresholds of World Bank’s analytical income categories (low,
middle, high income) updated every year to ensure that the income thresholds remain constant in real terms over time. The adjustments are made based on the effect of international
inflation, which is a measure of the average inflation of Japan, the United Kingdom, the
United States and the Euro Zone. The earliest available income thresholds at World Bank’s
database for analytical income groups are from the year 1987. Since that year, economies
are divided according to the revised income threshold level of the corresponding year.
While most of the countries observed to be stable, there are some countries that moved
from a lower income category to a higher one during that period. For those countries that
switched to a higher income category, Table B.1 marks the years in which this move is
occured. The exceptions are marked in the table.
Table B.1: List of Countries that Switched Income Groups
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Appendix C
Table C.1: Summary Statistics for GDP per capita Growth Regressions
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Appendix C: (cont.)

Table C.2: Summary Statistics for TFP growth regressions
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Appendix C (cont.)

Table C.3: Summary Statistics for Capital Stock growth regressions

69

Appendix D:
Coefficient estimates of Control Variables:

Table D.1: Coefficient Estimates of Control Variables for Public Debt Dependent Variable:
per capita GDP Growth
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Appendix D. Coefficient estimates of Control Variables: (cont.)

Table D.2: Coefficient Estimates of Control Variables for External Debt Dependent Variable: per capita GDP Growth
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Appendix E
Table E.1: Threshold Estimates
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Appendix F
Following figures present a summary of GDP growth across varying levels of public and
external debt for high income OECD, middle income and low income countries over the
period 1970-2009.
Figure F.1: Total Gross External Debt, Central Government Debt and Growth: High Income OECD Countries, 1970-2009
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Figure F.2: Total Gross External Debt, Central Government Debt and Growth: Middle
Income Countries, 1970-2009

Figure F.3: Total Gross External Debt, Central Government Debt and Growth: Low Income
Countries, 1970-2009
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Table F.1: Percentage Distribution of Observations Across Debt Regimes

Note: The table presents the percentage distribution of observations across four debt
regimes. For instance, for High Income OECD countries, 29% of 206 observations have
Public Debt-to-GDP ratio is less than 30% whereas for the same income group of countries there are 216 observations available for external debt regressions and 25 % of those
observations fall in the low debt regime group.
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Appendix G
Appendix G presents the normalized likelihood ratio plots as a function of the threshold
variable, LR(γ), against the potential threshold γ levels.

LR(γ) =

ˆ
S(γ) − S(γ)
σ̂ 2

The threshold variable is the least square estimate of γ that sets this statistic equal to
zero. For α = 1%, 5%, 10% a flat line at heteroscedasticity corrected critical value C(α)η̂ 2
is drawn for illustrative purposes. The confidence interval is the set of values of γ such that
LR(γ) ≤ C(α)η̂ 2 .
The critical value C(α) is the (1 − α) percentile of the asymptotic distribution of the
likelihood ratio LR(γ):
C(α) = −2log(1 −

p
(1 − α)

The estimate of the nuisance parmeter η is used to scale the confidence interval in
the case of heteroscedasticity. Details of the nuisance parameter estimation developed by
Hansen (2000) is included in Appendix A. Confidence interval is free of nuisance parameter
for homoskedastic errors (ie. η = 1).
Threshold values presented on the X-axis are all in natural logarithms.
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G.1. Confidence Interval Construction for Public Debt Threshold on
GDP growth:

Figure G.1: High Income OECD countries: Confidence Interval Construction for Public
Debt Threshold on GDP growth
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Figure G.2: Middle Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for Public Debt
Threshold on GDP growth

Figure G.3: Low Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for Public Debt
Threshold on GDP growth
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G.2. Confidence Interval Construction for Public Debt Threshold on
TFP growth:

Figure G.4: High Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for Public Debt
Threshold on TFP growth
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Figure G.5: Middle Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for Public Debt
Threshold on TFP growth

Figure G.6: Low Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for Public Debt
Threshold on TFP growth
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G.3 Confidence Interval Construction for Public Debt Threshold on
Capital Stock growth:

Figure G.7: High Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for Public Debt
Threshold on Capital Stock growth (Full Model)
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Figure G.8: Estimation for High Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for
Public Debt Threshold on Capital Stock growth (Intercept-Onlly Model)

Figure G.9: Middle Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for Public Debt
Threshold on Capital Stock growth
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Figure G.10: Low Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for Public Debt
Threshold on Capital Stock growth

G.4. Confidence Interval Construction for External Debt Threshold on
per capita GDP Growth:
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Figure G.11: High Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for External Debt
Threshold on per capita GDP Growth

Figure G.12: Middle Income Countries:Confidence Interval Construction for External Debt
Threshold on per capita GDP Growth
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Figure G.13: Low Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for External Debt
Threshold on per capita GDP Growth

G.5. Confidence Interval Construction for External Debt Threshold on
TFP Growth:
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Figure G.14: High Income OECD Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for External Debt Threshold on TFP Growth

Figure G.15: Middle Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for External
Debt Threshold on TFP Growth
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Figure G.16: Low Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for External Debt
Threshold on TFP Growth

G.6. Confidence Interval Construction for External Debt Threshold on
Capital Stock Growth:
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Figure G.17: High Income OECD Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for External Debt Threshold on Capital Stock Growth

Figure G.18: Middle Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for External
Debt Threshold on Capital Stock Growth (Full Model)
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Figure G.19: Middle Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for External
Debt Threshold on Capital Stock Growth (Intercept-Only model)

Figure G.20: Low Income Countries: Confidence Interval Construction for External Debt
Threshold on Capital Stock Growth
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Appendix H
H.1. Long Run Growth:

Table H.1: Public Debt and Growth: Regressions for 10-year averages (full model)
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H.1. Long Run Growth:

Table H.2: External Debt and Growth: Regressions for 10-year averages (full model)
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H.2. Additional Control Variables:
Table H.3: Public Debt and Growth Regressions with Additional Control Variables (full
model)
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Table H.4: Public Debt and Growth Regressions with Additional Control Variables (intercept only model)
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Table H.5: External Debt and Growth Regressions with Additional Control Variables(full
model)
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Table H.6: External Debt and Growth Regressions with Additional Control Variables (intercept only model)
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H.3. Income Groups Redefined
Table H.7: Public Debt and Growth Regressions for Redefined Income Groups

96

H.3. Income Groups Redefined (cont.)
Table H.8: External Debt and Growth Regressions for Redefined Income Groups
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